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COMMENTS

named in the unrecorded trust agreement was the beneficial owner of all the
rents and earnings of the property and the proceeds of any sale of the same.35
The issue before the Supreme Court in Barkhausen v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Company3" was whether or not the trustee was
the agent of the beneficiaries of an Illinois land trust. The trust property,
when conveyed to the trustee, was subject to a mortgage indenture containing a provision that on conveyance of the mortgaged property, the
mortgage obligations were to be assumed by the grantee. When he acquired title, the trustee executed an assumption agreement whereunder as
trustee, and not personally, he assumed all the covenants of the mortgagor
under the mortgage indenture. The Supreme Court held that this assumption agreement exonerated the trustee from personal liability, but did not
so relieve the beneficiaries in the absence of evidence showing that the
trustee acted as agent of the beneficiaries in executing the assumption
agreement. In short, Barkhausen stands for the proposition that the trustee
in an Illinois land trust is not the agent of the beneficiary solely by virtue
of acting on direction from the beneficiary.
CONCLUSION

This discussion by no means exhausts the myriad advantages available
under the Illinois land trust. There are further benefits, such as those in the
tax area which are outside the scope of this comment. Suffice it to say, in
summary, that the Illinois land trust differs substantially from the more
familiar common law land trust in the instances mentioned above.
35 Ibid., at 43.

36 3 Ill.2d 254, 120 N.E.2d 649 (1954).

HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF JUROR HANDBOOKS
AS A METHOD OF ORIENTATION
While the use of the jury system in criminal cases is widely approved as
an important cornerstone of justice,1 the inefficiencies and hazards present
in its operation have been widely criticized in recent years. 2 One of the
1 Knox, Jury Selection, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 433, 434 (1947) in which Judge Knox
reports the views expressed by the Section of Judicial Administration of the American

Bar Association at its meeting in July 1938. "Jury service ... is the chief remaining gov-

ernmental function in which lay citizens take a direct and active part, and trial by Jury

is the best means within our knowledge of keeping the administration of justice in tune
with the community." Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 183 (1946); Sherry,
Juries in Criminal Cases, 11 Law Soc. J. 192 (1944); A.B.A. Committee Report, The

Judge-Jury Relationship, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 3 (1943).
2 Broeder, The Functions of the Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 386 (1954); Coffin, Jury
Trial Tragic But Not Entirely Hopeless, 25 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 13 (1941); Miner, The
Jury Problem, 41 111. L. Rev. 183 (1946); Richardson, The Jury and Methods of Increasing Its Efficiency, 14 A.B.A.J. 410 (1928); Wicker, Jury Panels in Federal Courts,
22 Tenn. L. Rev. 203 (1952).
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most frequently mentioned defects in the jury system is the confusion,
delay and uncertainty caused by the "ignorance" of the juror. This "ignorance" is not so much a matter of lack of native intelligence as a deficiency
of information about his duties during the legal proceedings.3
The typical juror is plucked from his everyday life and thrust into a
maze of legal procedure which is undoubtedly confusing to the average
person. The terminology used in the courtroom is at least partially incomprehensible to him even in this day of television programs depicting courtroom proceedings. Since jury service is not a frequent experience, there is
little opportunity to learn the legal jargon and procedure by personal observation. Obviously, the operation of the jury system is handicapped by
this shortcoming in the prospective juror.
What is the solution to this problem? The two methods of enabling the
juror to gain the desired information which have been advocated by legal
writers are pretrial oral lectures by the court and the distribution of "jury
primers" or juror information booklets. 4 "Jury primers" were first introduced in the New York Courts in 1925.5 Since that time, the use of jury
information pamphlets of either the question and answer or narrative
types has been adopted in many states and the federal court system.6 Although no statistical report has been compiled, it is alleged that at least
some elevation of the level of juror interest and efficiency has been
7
achieved.
In view of the apparent need for preliminary juror instruction of some
sort, it would seem that the juror handbooks would be uniformly accepted
throughout the judicial systems. Unfortunately, while the original purpose
of the pamphlets was to provide the prospective jurors with a general outline of their duties, the contents of the booklets have touched on subjects
3 Galston, Civil Jury Trials and Tribulations, 29 A.BA.J. 195 (1943); Miner, The
L. Rev. 183 (1946); Richardson, The Jury and Methods of InJury Problem, 41 111.
creasing Its Efficiency, 14 A.BA.J. 410 (1928).
4
Carrington, A Handbook For Jurors, 9 Texas L. Rev. 37 (1930); Knox, Jury Selection, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 433 (1947); Richardson, The Jury and Methods of Increasing
Its Efficiency, 14 A.B.A.J. 410 (1928); A.B.A. Committee Report, The Judge-Jury Relationship, 23 Ore. L. Rev. 3 (1943); comment J. Crim. L. C. &P. S. 620 (1948).
r Primary Lessons For Jurors, 11 A.B.A.J. 289 (1925). Copy of the initial pamphlet
contained in 11 A.B.A.J. 401 (1925).
6Samples of several types of juror handbooks may be found in People v. Lopez, 32
Cal.2d 673, 677, 197 P.2d 757, 759 (1948); Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 183,
187 (1946); Primary Lessons For Jurors, 11 A.B.AJ. 401 (1925); Preliminary Instructions to Jurors, 17 A.BA.J. 282 (1931).
7Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 111. L. Rev. 183 (1946); Richardson, The Jury and
Methods of Increasing Its Efficiency, 14 A.B.J. 410 (1938); A.B.A. Committee Report,
23 Ore. L. Rev. 3, 6 (1943).
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and have been distributed in such a manner that they were subjected to
8
criticism by some of the courts.
PRETRIAL ORAL INSTRUCTIONS

The practice of giving preliminary oral lectures to the panel of jurors
on their duties was followed long before the introduction of jury handbooks.9 These remarks were customarily delivered by the court to the
entire jury panel after they reported for jury service and prior to voir dire
examination. 10 In the earlier cases prior to the adoption of jury booklets,
the contents of these lectures varied considerably. Although some judges
merely gave a general outline of the duties of a juror," others issued
"cautionary instructions" emphasizing the desirability of a speedy trial
and the undesirability of a controversy which might lead to a "hung
jury.' 1 2 No doubt, in each case, the court merely intended to inform the
jurors of a procedure which would increase their efficiency. However, the
patent difficulty in phrasing the preliminary instructions in an acceptable
manner is all the more formidable when orally given. By a slip of the
tongue or poor choice of language, the most well meaning judge can make
a statement which will tend to substantially prejudice the rights of the
accused to a fair trial.
The state courts have been highly critical of oral dissertations to the
jurors, prior to the cases involving oral instructions combined with the
s United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177, 188 (C.A. 7th, 1958) (dissent); People v.
Lopez, 32 Cal.2d 673, 685, 197 P.2d 757, 766 (1948) (dissent); People v. Schoos, 399 Ill.
527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948).

9 Thomas v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 432, 262 S.W. 84 (1924); Williams v. State, 89 Tex.
Crim. 334, 231 S.W. 110 (1921); Hammet v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 635, 209 S.W. 661
(1919); State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 133 P. 878 (1913).
10 People v. Tennant, 32 Cal. App. 2d 1, 88 P.2d 937 (1939); Pugh v. State, 131 Tex.
Crim. 169, 97 S.W.2d 200 (1936); Blackshear v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 417, 72 S.W.2d
601 (1934); People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930); Thomas v. State, 97 Tex.
Crim. 432, 262 S.W. 84 (1924); Williams v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 334, 231 S.W. 110

(1921); Hammett v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 635, 209 S.W. 661 (1919); State v. Miller, 90
Kan. 230, 133 Pac. 878 (1913).

11 People v. Tennant, 32 Cal. App. 2d 1, 88 P.2d 937 (1939); People v. Fisher, 340 I11.
216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930); Blackshear v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 417, 72 S.W.2d 601 (1934);
Hammett v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 635, 209 S.W. 661 (1919).
12 In Pugh v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 169, 170, 97 S.W.2d 200 (1936), the assembled
jury panel was told: "[T]hat in case of disagreement one juror should yield 'his judgment in order to keep from having a hung jury."' In Williams v. State, 89 Tex. Crim.
334, 23 S.W. 110, 111 (1921), the trial judge instructed the jury: "[Tihat they should
pay close attention to the testimony, thereby avoid controversy among themselves
touching the statements of the witnesses, and that by thus proceeding a verdict might
be reached more speedily and more satisfactorily." In State v. Miller, 90 Kan. 230, 234,
133 P. 878, 880 (1913), the court stated: "[Alnd my experience has taught me that there
are more than 100 guilty men who escape to one innocent man convicted."
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distribution of jury primers.'" But they universally refused to regard the
remarks as sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. Doubtful remarks
have been found not prejudicial because the defense counsel selected a

jury satisfactory to the defendant after voir dire examination,' 4 or because
the court instructed the jurors that its remarks should not be regarded as
tending to show guilt or innocence of the accused after the remarks were
objected to,' 5 or that the contents of the lecture were not prejudicial in

general.' 6 In one case, a California court stated that: "The outline of the
duties by the trial court, although unusual, is7 within the inherent power
of the court in controlling the proceedings."'
The preliminary oral remarks referred to above should not be confused
with oral instructions given at the time of the charge to the jury. The
problem involved in the latter category primarily concerns final instructions which are required by statute to be in writing.' 8
Considering the consistent criticism of preliminary lectures by the court
and the previously stated general feeling that some sort of juror education
was required to raise their efficiency, the growing trend toward adopting
"jury primers" was inevitable.
JURY HANDBOOKS

IN THE STATE COURTS PRIOR

TO UNITED STATES V. GORDON

19

The first case in which it was contended that the use of juror handbook
constituted bias was Knight v. State.20 In that controversy, the Supreme
13 The giving of oral preliminary instructions "is not commended, and should be
indulged, if at all, with great caution." People v. Fisher, 340 IlI. 216, 247, 172 N.E. 743,
756 (1930); "[T]rial courts should avoid venturing out into broad fields of lectures to
juries.. . ." Thomas v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 432, 262 S.W. 84, 85 (1924); "The practice
of lecturing the jury is always fraught with the danger that either the language or the
motive of the court may be misconstrued." Williams v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 334, 231
S.W. 110, 111 (1921).

14 People v. Tennant, 32 Cal. App. 2d 1, 88 P.2d 937 (1939); People v. Fisher, 340 Ill.
216, 172 N.E. 743 (1930).
15 Williams v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 334, 231 S.W. 110 (1921).
16 Pugh v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 169, 97 S.W.2d 200 (1936); Blackshear v. State, 126
Tex. Crim. 417, 72 S.W.2d 601 (1934); Hammett v. State, 84 Tex. Grim. 635, 209 S.W.
661 (1919).
17 The court stated this theory without citation of any constitutional, statutory or
judicial authority. It sems to fairly summarize the underlying feeling of the state courts
which have passed on preliminary oral lectures to jurors. People v. Tennant, 32 Cal.2d
1, 88 P.2d 937, 940 (1939).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1929) c. 110, S 73; People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934);
People v. Kelly, 347 111.221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931). See People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 216, 172
N.E. 745 (1930).
United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
50 Ariz. 108, 69 P.2d 569 (1937). The pamphlet involved was called "Instructions
to the Jurors from the Judges of the Maricopa County Superior Court."
'9

20
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Court of Arizona found nothing in the pamphlet which would tend to
prejudice the rights of the defendant. Rather, they stated:
IT]he pamphlet contains some very wholesome and helpful advice to jurors,
which if followed, would not only advance the administration of justice but
remove many of the objections to and criticisms of the jury system. 2'
The court relied solely on the fact that several other states were already
utilizing the handbooks and that the pamphlet in question was based on a
copy of a juror handbook being used in the Michigan courts.2 2 The general proposition of whether the courts had the authority to issue preliminary instructions was answered, "If anyone has questioned the trial
court's right to issue instructions to jurors, we have not been able to
locate the case." 23s The court further pointed out that the appellant had
advanced no contention of specific prejudice to the defendant's cause. It
was inferred that had specific prejudice been proven to result from the distribution of the handbook, a new trial would have been granted.2 4
In People v. Cowan,2 5 the appellants maintained that the handing out of
the pamphlet in another department of the court was a deprivation of the
constitutional right of "due process" in that it consisted of instructions
given to the jurors outside the presence of the defendants. The court did
not pass on the contents of the handbook since it did not appear in the
record. The conviction was affirmed primarily because the appellant
failed to show even a possibility of prejudice resulting from the distribution of the pamphlets.
It cannot be assumed that the fact that some or all of the jurors at some
other time had been generally instructed as to their duties, or had received
other instructions in some other case, would result in a disqualification or
would prevent them from fairly acting under and in accordance with the
specific instructions given to them in this particular case. 26
The first judicial recognition that prejudice might result from exposure
to a juror handbook came in People v. Weatherford.27 The prospective
jurors were given a 15-page pamphlet entitled: "General Instructions
Concerning the Duties and Responsibility of Trial Jurors in the Criminal
Departments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California.
Read and Study Them Carefully. ' 28 The appellate court reversed a con21

Ibid., at 572.

22 Ibid., at 573; Kansas, Michigan, New York and Washington.
28 Ibid., at 573.
24

At

this early stage, no consideration was given to the objections that the pam-

phlets impinged on the right of the accused to trial by jury or invaded the legislative

prerogative.

Cal. App. 2d 155, 112 P.2d 62 (1941).
6Ibid., at 160, 65.
27 160 P.2d 210 (1945).

2544

2

28

Ibid., at 216 (emphasis supplied).
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viction for murder on the following grounds: (1) That the contents of
the pamphlet were not a mere "short summary of the general duties of

Jurors" but detailed instructions on matters of law; 28 (2) that since all in-

structions to the jury were required to be in writing by statute, the fundamental constitutional rights of the defendant were violated;80 and (3)
that since certain statements in the pamphlet were found to be wholly inapplicable to a murder case, the court refused to assume under the circumstances that the statements were not confusing, misleading and prejudicial.8 1 The court in comparing the Co'wan case emphasized that the contents of the pamphlet in that case were not examined because it did not
82
appear in the record.
Less than two months later, the Supreme Court of Washington refused
to overrule a denial of a motion for new trial because the mere availability
of a juror handbook was not prejudicial.8 8 The appellant failed to show
that the pamphlet had even been seen by any of the jurors. Further, counsel had full knowledge of the existence of the pamphlet prior to the verdict and had failed to call it to the court's attention prior to entry of the
verdict. The question as to whether the pamphlet itself might be prejudi84
cial was not decided.

In People v. Schoos,8 5 the Illinois Supreme Court examined a "jury
primer" closely. A conviction for armed robbery was reversed and remanded on the reasoning that the trial court had prejudiced the rights of
the appellant by personally distributing the "jury primers" accompanied
by an oral admonition that: "I may want to interrogate you on the principles and propositions contained therein. '83 All the jurors did, in fact,
read and study the "primer" and listen to the lecture and admonition by
the trial court.
The court's objections to the handbook were two: First, that many of
the statements in the "primer," while they might not be misleading to a
lawyer, would "most assuredly" be misleading to a layman; 3 7 and, second,
29 bid., at 217.
80 Cal. Const. Art. 6, S4 Y; Cal. Penal Code S§ 1047, 1127.
81 The court specifically pointed out the following: "A verdict of guilty does not necessarily mean a term of imprisonment in the state prison, but may, in some cases, result
in a county jail sentence, a fine, or proceedings under the provisions of the probation
law." People v. Weatherford, 160 P.2d 210, 212 (1945).
82 Ibid., at 216, 217.
88 State v. Cooney, 23 Wash. 2d 539, 546, 161 P.2d 442, 446 (1945).
84 Ibid.
85 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948). A copy of the booklet written and used by the
court may be found in: Miner, The Jury Problem, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 183 (1946); comment
in 38 J. Crim. L.C.&P.S. (1948); noted in 62 Harv. L. Rev. 139 (1948).
87 Ibid., at 531, 247.
36 399 111. 527, 530, 78 N.E.2d 245, 247 (1948).
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that the use of the handbook deprived the appellant of his constitutional
right to trial by jury as guaranteed at common law. It was stated that by
requiring the jurors to read and absorb the contents of the pamphlet, the
court was disqualifying jurors who would otherwise be qualified under
the legislative scheme.38
About six months after the Schoos decision, the California Supreme
Court, in People v. Lopez 3 9 confirmed a conviction for assault with a
deadly weapon in spite of the defendant's contention that the distribution
of a jury booklet entitled "General Instructions" constituted instruction
of the jurors outside the presence of the appellant and his counsel. No
claim was made that any part of the pamphlet contained erroneous statements of law. Nor was it proven that any of the jurors had read the hand40

book.

The majority opinion in the Lopez case met the constitutional question
squarely. It stated: (1) The pamphlet was intended to be merely a general
outline on juror duties and not the instructions that were required by
statute to be given the jury at the close of the trial; (2) that neither the
letter nor the spirit of the California Constitution required the keeping of
prospective jurors in a state of ignorance concerning general preliminary
information which makes them more able to perform their duties; and (3)
that the constitutional guaranty is sufficiently preserved where the trial
court instructs the jury as to the problems of the individual case in the
41
presence of the defendant.
The dissenting opinion disputed the propositions set out by the majority. It criticized specific sections as being incorrect statements of the law.
Further, the claim that the instructions were merely general advice to the
jurors was incorrect in that "[t]hey go into great detail on many questions
of the value of various kinds of evidence and the like."'42 The minority em-

phasized that since the booklets were issued by an attache of the court, it
is probable that the recipient would feel duty bound to study them thoroughly. And since the prospective juror would have more time to study
the "General Instructions" than the specific instructions by the court, the
former would be more deeply impressed upon his mind. 43
The use of jury booklets was inferentially approved in Klettke v. State.44
The point directly in litigation was the giving of oral pretrial indoctrina38 111. Const. Art. 11, S 5; 111. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 78, S2; People v. Schoos, 399 Il. 527,
78 N.E.2d 245, 251 (1948).
3 32 Cal. 2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948).
40 Copy of the pamphlet used set out in full in People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d 673,677, 197
P.2d 757, 759 (1948).

41 Cal. Const. Art. I, S 13.
42 People v. Lopez, 32 Cal.2d 673, 676, 197 P.2d 757, 760 (1948).
43 Ibid., at 676, 760.
44223 P.2d 787 (1950).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

tion, but the court approved any type of juror instruction of a general
nature.
In summary, prior to 1958, Arizona and California had generally
approved the use of juror handbooks with Washington and Oklahoma indicating that the distribution and use would be approved if the question
was raised.4 1 Only Illinois had specifically disapproved the use of a "jury
primer" as being a departure from the statutory scheme for qualification
of jurors.4 6 It should be noted that the point of whether the handbooks

constituted impingement on the right to trial by jury was raised only 4in7
California and Illinois where the decisions were squarely contradictory.
The "inherent power" of the courts to give general written instructions
appears to have originated in Knight v. State45 simply because there had
been no decisions on the point prior to that time. No doubt, any of these
five states would have granted a new trial if specific prejudice of a substantial nature could have proven to result from the use of a juror handbook.
THE GORDON CASE

The juror handbook question was presented for the first time in a federal court in United States v. Gordon.49 Because this is the basis for all the
later decisions in both the federal and state courts, it should be subject to
5
the closest scrutiny. 0

The petit juror handbook used in the federal district courts at the
option of the court was severely criticized by a three judge panel in the
original Gordon opinion rendered on July 16, 1957. Subsequently, on petition of the United States, a rehearing en bane on the handbook question
was granted. Upon rehearing, the court reversed itself on the handbook
issue by a vote of three to two. The first opinion was stricken with respect
to the ruling on the handbook and the opinion rendered on rehearing was
51
substituted.
45 People v. Lopez, 32 Cal.2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948); Knight v. State, 50 Ariz. 108,
69 P.2d 569 (1937). Accord: Klettke v. State, 223 P.2d 787 (1950); State v. Cooney, 23
Wash.2d 539, 161 P.2d 442 (1945).
46 People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948).
47 People v. Lopez, 32 Cal.2d 673, 197 P.2d 757 (1948); People v. Schoos, 229 Ill. 527,
78 N.E.2d 245 (1948).
48 Knight v. State, 50 Ariz. 108, 69 P.2d 569 (1937).

49 253 F.2d 177 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
50 Horton v. United States, 256 F.2d 138 (C.A. 6th, 1958); United States v. Mathison,
256 F.2d 803 (C.A. 7th, 1958); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation, 258 F.2d
104 (C.A. 2d, 1958); Ferrarra v. State, 101 So. 2d 797 (1958); People v. Izzo, 14 Ill.2d
203, 151 N.E.2d 329 (1958).

51253 F.2d 177 (C.A. 7th, 1958). The initial panel was composed of Judges Finnegan,
Major, and Schnackenberg. Prior to rehearsing, Judge Major who wrote the original

opinion retired. The rehearing en banc was before Chief Judge Duffy and Judges
Finnegan, Hastings, Parkinson and Schnackenberg.
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The pamphlet in question had been given to the prospective petit jurors
upon reporting for service. They were told that it was a "nice jury book
'52
and they should read it."
The majority opinion, written by Judge Parkinson, concerned itself
primarily with the method of objection to the distribution of the pamphlet by challenging the array. It was held that the proper manner of discovering possible bias of the jurors by the handbook was a challenge to
the polls for cause. The court stated that in absence of such a challenge
for cause, the defendant had waived his right to disqualify any juror on
grounds that he was prejudiced as a result of exposure to the juror hand53
book.
Chief Judge Duffy, in a concurring opinion, proclaimed that: (1)
Nothing in the contents of the handbook or the manner of distribution of
it was "[A]n impingement upon the jury system or an invasion of the
prerogatives of the legislative branch of the government; '5 4 (2) that the
pamphlet was not meant by its authors to be more than a broad orientation of jurors to their duties and not an all inclusive treatise of criminal
and civil law; 55 (3) if the handbook is considered as a whole, there is no
basis for claiming that it contained prejudicial error in the instant case;
and (4) that the Judicial Conference of the United States was acting within
its statutory authority in ordering the issuance of the handbook. 56
Judge Finnegan, concurring as to the reversal of the conviction but dissenting as to the handbook issue, quoted in extenso from the original opinion. He maintained that: (1) The challenge to the array was sufficient to
preserve the handbook question for review under Federal Rule 52(b);57
(2) the pamphlet purported to inform the juror as to procedure and the
rights of a person in both criminal and civil cases, and in doing so, it was
52 Ibid., at 184. In conversation on February 11, 1959, Mr. Roy H. Johnson, Clerk,
Northern District Court, Illinois stated that the handbook was immediately withdrawn
from use after the Gordon trial upon direction of the court and its use has not been

resumed.
5 Chitty's Criminal Law, 5th American Edition, Vol. I, pp. 535(a) to 539; Cooley's
Blackstone, 3rd Edition, Vol. II, pp. 357 to 359.
54 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; 28 U.S.C.A. S 1861 (Supp., 1958); 111.Rev. Stat. (1957)
c. 78, § 2; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Capital Traction Company v.
Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1898).

55
United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d 177 (C.A. 7th, 1958). The handbook was prepared by a committee of five eminent federal district court judges appointed by Chief
Justice Harlan Stone. After revision, it was submitted to the Judicial Conference of the
United States which approved it and authorized the Administrative Office to have it
printed and distributed.
5628 U.S.C.A. § 331 (Supp., 1958); 28 U.S.C.A. §604 (Supp., 1958).
57 18 U.S.C.A., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 52 provides: "(b) Plain
Error-Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of the court."
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defective in that some of the statements made were incorrect and, more
important, in the statements that were omitted;58 (3) that distribution of
the handbook constituted impingement on the right of the accused to trial
by jury in that it required jurors to be especially educated for the trial; 59
(4) the issuance of the pamphlets was an invasion of the prerogatives of
Congress in that it made juror qualifications other than those required by
statute;60 and (5) the Judicial Conference of the United States cannot go
beyond issuing recommendations and suggestions under the statute which
created it. It acted beyond its power in authorizing the Administrative
Director to issue the handbooks. 6 '
THE IMPACT OF THE GORDON CASE

In view of the strong conflict in the Gordon case, one would expect
some efforts to "cop a plea" by advancing the contentions of the dissent.
In Horton v. United States,62 handbooks were distributed to members
of the jury prior to the trial. The defense counsel, in moving for a new
trial, alleged that the use of the handbook was unknown to him at the
time of the trial. His argument used the substance of the Gordon dissent
and asserted that the discovery of the distribution of the pamphlet was
new evidence sufficient to warrant a new trial because of prejudice. The
motion was denied and upon appeal the trial court's ruling was affirmed,
relying on the majority reasoning in Gordon. The Court of Appeals declared:
[I]n dealing with the charge of prejudice, we do not consider it in a vacuum,
out of context and disassociated from attendant circumstances. 3There was no
showing that any member of the jury had read the handbook.
In addition, the court pointed out: "To say that the challenged statement
impinged upon the independent judgement of the jurors would .. .open
64

the door to innumerable appeals....

58 Particular criticism was leveled at the following statement: "A verdict of guilty
does not necessarily mean that the defendant will receive a long sentence or that he will
be required to serve any sentence at all. The Judge may impose such sentence as appears to him to be just with the limits fixed by law or in a proper case he may suspend
sentence and place the defendant on probation." United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d
177, 190 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
59 U.S. Const. Amend. VI; 28 U.S.CA. S 1861 (Supp. 1958); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c.
78, S 2.
6o Ibid.
6128 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 604 (Supp. 1958); Judge Hastings concurred with Chief Judge
Duffy and Judge Parkinson without separate opinion. United States v. Gordon, 253
F.2d 177, 189 (C.A. 7th, 1958). Judge Schnackenberg concurred substantially with
Judge Finnegan's dissent on the handbook issue. Ibid., at 191.
62 256 F.2d 138 (C.A. 6th, 1958).
64 Ibid., at 143.
65 Ibid., at 142.
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In United States v. Mathison,6 5 appellant, relying on the original opinion
in Gordon, moved to vacate sentence. The motion was denied and, upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. The decision was based
on the second Gordon opinion and the fact that the appellant had in no
way raised the point during the trial.
The handbook issue arose again in United States v. Allied Stevedoring
66
Corporation
where the pamphlets were not distributed to the prospective
jurors, but one of the trial jurors studied a pamphlet which he possessed
from a previous term of jury service. He correctly advised his fellow
jurors, while in deliberation, concerning the matter of whether the jury
could recommend leniency for one of the defendants. The jury did not
rely on this advice, but sought and received special instructions from the
court on this point. A motion for retrial based on the contention that the
use of the pamphlet denied a fair trial was denied. Upon appeal, the ruling
was affirmed, citing the Gordon case. It was pointed out that the jury was
67
not, in fact, influenced in any way.
The "jury primer" was commented on by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in People v. Izzo.68 It was a murder case and the jurors were given oral remarks outlining their duties prior to voir dire examination. No handbook
was used. In his extemporaneous dissertation, the trial judge misstated several things, none of which were found to prejudice the rights of the
accused to trial by jury. The court stated, "[N]o litigant has a right, constitutional or otherwise, to have his case tried before ignorant jurors."6' 9
Even though the handbook question was not involved, the court, in dicta,
stated that on the subject of "jury primers," it reversed the decision in
People v. Schoos.70
The first litigation of the handbook issue in Florida was in Ferrarrav.
State.71 After examining the pamphlet, it was held that it did not change
the local juror qualifications nor did it constitute a premature charge. The
court rejected the argument that the booklet was a premature charge because it found no statements therein that "could be dignified as charges on
72
questions of law."
CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion, there can be no justifiable doubt that
there is a need for some specie of orientation to prepare jurors to do an
65 256 F.2d 803 (C.A. 7th, 1958).
66 258 F.2d 104 (C.A. 2d, 1958). Noted in 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 115 (1958).
67 United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corporation, 258 F.2d 104, 107 (C.A. 2d, 1958).
68 14 Ill. 2d 203, 151 N.E.2d 329 (1958).
69 Ibid., at 209, 334.
70 Ibid. But cf. People v. Schoos, 399 Ill. 527, 78 N.E.2d 245 (1948).
71 101 So.2d 797 (1958).
72 Fla. Stat. (1955) §5 40.01(3), 918.10; Ferrarra v. State, 101 So.2d 797, 801 (1958).
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intelligent and efficient job. Oral instructions by the court are not a good
solution to the problem. They are subject to the difficulties inherent in
any extemporaneous speech. A slip of the tongue, poor phrasing or the
unconscious insertion of a loose or erroneous statement of the law is infinitely more likely to occur when oral preliminary indoctrination is attempted.
A close examination of the leading cases on the juror handbook question
discloses the principal objections to them to be the following: (1) The
contents attempt to cover too much ground in legal procedure and evidentiary matter; (2) they have almost uniformly phrased certain statements
poorly; (3) by requiringthe distribution and use, either expressly or impliedly, the courts preempt the power of the legislature to control the
qualifications required of jurors and impinge upon the constitutional right
to trial by jury; and (4) the primers constitute premature charges outside
the presence of the accused.
With all proper deference to the extremely learned members of the
judiciary who have drafted the various handbooks, it must be pointed out
that some of the context has been objectionable in phrasing. That there
has been criticism from several federal judges and supreme court justices
of two of the larger states in the Union reinforces this view. It would be
relatively easy to remedy this situation by avoiding the previously criti78
cized pitfalls in future editions.
The contention that a juror handbook constitutes a premature charge
outside the presence of the accused has been properly denied by all courts
passing on it. This theory has little efficacy if the contents of the booklets
do not contain the oft contested statements.
The most knotty objection is that of impingement on the jury system
and invasion of the prerogatives of the legislatures to set up minimum
qualifications for jurors. It is a dead issue for the time being, but may possibly be resurrected at some future time.
Three suggested cures are: (1) Elimination of the practice of placing
symbols of the court's authority and statements to the effect of "read this
or else" on the covers and frontispieces of the pamphlets should overcome
the criticism that there is an express or implied command to assimilate the
proffered information; (2) if need be, the "primers" should be printed
under the auspices of the American Bar Association or the local bar association to remove any doubts as to the preempting of the legislative prerogative; and (3), the most extreme and surest cure would be to amend
the statutory juror qualification to state that the distribution and use of the
handbooks are within the power of the courts.
73 Handbook on Jury Service, with a special preface by Judge Bolitha J. Laws,
United States District Court, Washington, D.C. Published for the Institute of Judicial
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